Predictive policing management: a brief history of patrol automation by Wilson, Dean
Predictive policing management: a brief history of patrol 
automation
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Wilson, Dean (2020) Predictive policing management: a brief history of patrol automation. New 
Formations: A Journal of Culture, Theory, Politics, 98. pp. 139-155. ISSN 0950-2378 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/90743/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
 1 
 
PREDICTIVE POLICING MANAGEMENT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF PATROL AUTOMATION 
 
Dean Wilson 
Sociology 
University of Sussex 
Brighton, United Kingdom 
 
Dean.wilson@sussex.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
Predictive policing has attracted considerably scholarly attention. Extending the promise 
of being able to interdict crime prior to its commission, it seemingly promised forms of 
anticipatory policing that had previously existed only in the realms of science fiction. The 
aesthetic futurism that attended predictive policing did, however, obscure the important 
historical vectors from which it emerged. The adulation of technology as a tool for 
achieving efficiencies in policing was evident from the 1920s in the United States, 
reaching sustained momentum in the 1960s as the methods of Systems Analysis were 
applied to policing. Underpinning these efforts resided an imaginary of automated patrol 
facilitated by computerized command and control systems. The desire to automate police 
work has extended into the present, and is evident in an emergent platform policing – 
cloud-based technological architectures that increasingly enfold police work. Policing is 
consequently datafied, commodified and integrated into the circuits of contemporary 
digital capitalism.  
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‘Predictive Policing’ is the latest buzz-term within policing circles. Heralded by Time 
Magazine in 2011 as one of the 50 greatest inventions of the year, predictive policing – 
emerging in the US shortly after the Financial Crash of 2008 – is now a global 
phenomenon rapidly being deployed in policing agencies.1 Predictive policing may be 
defined as ‘the application of analytical techniques—particularly quantitative 
techniques—to identify likely targets for police intervention and prevent crime or solve 
past crimes by making statistical predictions’.2 The statistical predictions of predictive 
policing fall into two broad categories – predictions of places and predictions of persons, 
with the latter being the most controversial. The use of predictive analytics and machine 
learning has attracted enormous attention, linking predictive policing with digital 
innovations in automation rapidly advancing across numerous employment sectors. 
Interest in predictive policing to date has largely dwelt on the temporal novelty of its 
claim—that crimes can be predicted and interdicted before they occur. The opacity and 
quasi-mystical character assumed by the algorithms engaged has generated enthusiasm, 
scepticism and strident criticism. Technology vendors and some police view predictive 
policing as an invaluable aid to policing in an economic downturn, one that facilitates 
targeting of scarce resources while effectively dealing with crime. Critics suggest it will 
merely reinscribe and intensify patterns of racialised and militarized policing. Yet, despite 
the aesthetic futurism evident in media coverage and in technology trade literature – 
predictive policing is the culmination of longer-term historical vectors in the 
‘scientification’ of police work that accelerated from the early twentieth century.3  
 
Writing in 1967, Albert Reiss and David Bordua made the incisive comment that within 
police organisations ‘every development in technology for police control of the 
population is accompanied by changes in the capacity of the organization to control its 
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members’.4 Acknowledging the continued salience of this observation, this article seeks 
to examine through historical perspective what predictive policing represents in terms of 
the organisation, distribution and control of the police patrol function. My central 
argument is that there has been a persistent desire, particularly strident in the United States 
following the Second World War, to automate the police patrol function. Such desires 
have often been impeded by the autonomous nature of police patrol work, and the 
difficulty of quantifying the indeterminacies represented by the agential actions of 
individual officers. In the early twentieth century attempts to control and distribute patrol 
looked to the precepts of scientific management. From the 1960s much hope was vested 
in computerisation and the application of Systems Analysis to police patrol work. 
Underlying these efforts resided a series of puzzling questions that were straightforward 
in industrial sectors, but proved complex for police organizations: what was policing’s 
product? How were police organisations to be made efficient, and how could this 
efficiency be measured? Predictive policing appears to be the solution for many of these 
problems. 
 
Command, Control and Calculation 
In early twentieth century America, progressive reformers began to view police agencies as antiquated 
and dysfunctional organisations unfit for the needs of a modern industrial society. One of the first 
motion picture representations of policing compounded this perspective. Mack Sennett’s Keystone 
Cops were incompetent dullards, bewildered by modern technologies such as the telephone and 
automobile, and utterly ineffectual. As early as 1910 the International Association of Chiefs of Police 
decried early representations of police officers, who were, they claimed, ‘sometimes made to appear 
ridiculous’. They went on to protest that young people attending motion-picture houses were given 
‘an improper idea of the policeman’.5 Nevertheless, early research conducted into police departments 
appeared to suggest that Sennett’s Keystone Cops were far closer to reality than the IACP cared to 
admit. Between 1915 and 1917 Raymond Fosdick undertook a comprehensive study of US police 
departments for the Rockefeller-funded Bureau of Social Hygiene, conducting investigations in 
seventy-two US cities. Published in 1920 as American Police Systems his findings were damning. 
Concluding his study, Fosdick commented that there was ‘little to be proud of’ and that American 
police systems were ‘sordid and unworthy’. His study concluded that although Americans had been 
‘successful in the organization of business and commerce, pre-eminent in many lines of activity, we 
must confess failure in the elemental responsibility laid on all people’s who call themselves civilized 
of preserving order in their communities’.6  
 
As Fosdick’s allusion to business and commerce suggest, the solution advocated was comprehensive 
modernisation of police structures through the application of modern business techniques, most 
specifically conceptions of scientific management. Arthur Woods, Police Commissioner of New York 
City between 1914-1918, suggested that police departments needed to restructure ‘just as an army or 
a big business organisation is arranged, so as to meet and conquer all difficulties that arise’.7 The 
imperative to restructure policing in line with modern notions of industrial efficiency was reinforced 
by further research projects that drew on the emerging academic field of ‘public administration’. The 
National Institute of Public Administration in New York – founded in 1905 as the Bureau of City 
Betterment and until 1921 known as the Bureau of Municipal Affairs – conducted studies in seventeen 
US cities between 1913 and 1924.8 The Institute – whose mission was defined as ‘applying the test 
of fact to the analysis of municipal problems and the application of scientific method to governmental 
procedure’ – was strongly shaped by F.W. Taylor’s 1911 publication Shop Management.9 The advice 
arising from the Institute’s projects consistently advocated the application of modern business 
techniques to patrol supervision, scientific planning for police departments, the circulation of orders 
in written form to strengthen day-to-day supervision, and the rationalisation of police reporting and 
records.  
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A Police Chief from the Berkeley Police Department in California, August Vollmer, emerged as the 
principal interwar embodiment of the philosophy that came to be known as ‘police professionalism’. 
Something of an autodidact, Vollmer enthusiastically embraced both technology and the principles of 
scientific management in the organisation of policing. The key elements of police professionalism 
fell into three broad categories: the centralization of authority, the rationalization of command and 
control and elevation of the quality of police personnel. This broad programme of reform was eagerly 
embraced by the IACP, who hoped it would raise policing to the status of a profession, akin to law 
and medicine.10 While Vollmer developed innovations such as crime laboratories that projected 
images of policing as a scientific enterprise, the lynchpin of the police professionalisation project was 
the fusion of radio communications with automobility. For Vollmer the growing complexity of urban 
environments placed added burdens on police departments that could only be addressed through 
embracing the latest developments in science and technology. Patrol cars equipped with two-way 
radios became imbued with almost magical qualities, energizing a thread of ‘techno-solutionism’ that 
extends into the present.11 Vollmer was tireless in his promotion of radio-equipped patrol cars, 
commenting that ‘snaring criminals in a radio network woven by broadcasting to radio-equipped cars 
has become a matter of seconds’ something which had ‘synchronized the arrest with depredation’.12 
Vollmer effusively extolled the omnipotent police power enabled through automobility fused with 
radio communications, suggesting that: 
 
With advent of the radio equipped car a new era has come…Districts of many 
square miles…are now covered by the roving patrol car, fast, efficient, stealthy, 
having no regular beat to patrol, just as liable to be within 60 feet as 3 miles of 
the crook plying his trade–the very enigma of this specialized fellow who is 
coming to realize that a few moments may bring them down about him like a 
swarm of bees–this lightening swift “angel of death”13 
 
 
Radio-equipped patrol cars were to become the main means of police patrol within several decades. 
While the radio-equipped patrol car altered relations between the police and the public, they also 
transformed the relationship between patrol officers and their supervisors. Two-way radios were 
introduced in 1929 meaning that cars could be alerted immediately of a call for assistance. But the 
patrol officer could also be checked on frequently and without notice. The potential for remote control 
of patrol officers enabled by two-way radio communications was seen as so significant that some 
believed city crime might be eliminated entirely.14 Other commentators saw the potential for a 
continuous uninterrupted transmission that rendered the patrol officer amenable to command; 
regardless of their proximity to a patrol vehicle. In 1936 one Police Chief from Wyandotte, Michigan 
predicted the increased portability of radio communications, suggesting that ‘the time will come when 
every individual policeman on the beat will be equipped with a small radio receiver and be directed 
by radio orders’. Small belt radios were already in use by 1940 in Atlantic City, although this 
development rolled out only slowly across other police departments. 15  The imaginary of an 
uninterrupted transmission of command and control was to reappear throughout the post-war years. 
 
August Vollmer reflected approvingly on American policing’s transformation in 1933, remarking that: 
‘the principles of military science, including those of strategy, tactics logistics, communications, and 
others, were adopted by the police and applied to the problem of reducing crime and protecting the 
community’.16 While Vollmer explicitly cited military influences, the template for police reform was 
equally the structure of the modern corporation and its focus on results. This focus on the ‘product’ 
of policing fuelled a concurrent reconceptualization of policing. Earlier in his career, Vollmer had 
been optimistic that police departments could be agents of broader social transformation through 
attacking the root social and psychological causes of crime, as well as its surface manifestations.  The 
patrol officer, he suggested, would be a ‘practical criminologist’ armed with the latest criminological 
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research and theories and able to intervene in people’s lives before they entered a life of crime.17 The 
difficulty of demonstrating results from such an undertaking, however, led to this broader concept of 
policing – largely linked to the historical social service role of police – to evaporate. William H. 
Parker, Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department in the 1950s and 60s, claimed that police could 
do little more than apply ‘emergency treatment’ to ‘surface wounds’. Parker’s view was that police 
‘could contain but not convert criminals, repress but not prevent crime’.18 The defining of policing as 
exclusively concerned with crime control had the advantage of providing clear measures of police 
efficiency and productivity. The speed at which police responded to calls for service – along with 
statistical variations in crime rates as a result of police interventions – would provide a clear and 
calculable basis for assessing police work. It was intensifying the pace of police response that seized 
the imaginations of systems analysts in the 1960s, and which formed the basis for the progressive 
mathematization of policing.  
 
Systems Analysis was developed by Edward Paxson at RAND Corporation in the late 1940s and was 
a development of Operations Research. It owed a debt to Herbert Simon’s theories of administrative 
rationality, which extended mathematical formalization into the realm of business of social 
problems. 19  Simon – a polymath who straddled fields of philosophy, administrative science, 
computation and artificial intelligence – confidently predicted in his 1960 publication The New 
Science of Management Decision that ‘technologically…machines will be capable, within twenty 
years, of doing any work that a man can do’ going on to suggest that the routinisation of tasks inherent 
in automation would for many workers constitute ‘a welcome refuge from the trackless forests of 
unfamiliar problem spaces’.20 Operations Research had rested on the mission of calculating the most 
effective use of existing equipment. The objectives of Systems Analysis were, however, considerably 
more expansive. Systems Analysis presented a range of options based upon mathematical modelling 
but also incorporating a combination of concepts drawn from social psychology, economics, control 
theory and other social and behavioural sciences. As David Noble argues, by the early 1960s Systems 
Analysis had ‘attained a force and an aura all its own’.21    
 
The force of Systems Analysis was brought to bear on problems of policing in the Task Force Report 
on Science and Technology published in 1967 as part of the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The Task Force Report was prepared by the Institute 
of Defence Analysis (IDA), founded as a competitor to RAND Corporation, and able to pay higher 
salaries than government departments through its status as a Federally-Funded Research and 
Development Centre.22 The IDA conducted research on nuclear war, ballistic missile programs and 
the feasibility of missile defence systems, and was contracted to oversee a special report on the 
application of science and technology to the criminal justice system. The Task Force Report was 
based on a reading of current technological developments and their potential application to policing. 
The valence towards economy was evident in the brief outline of systems analysis offered, which 
defined it as the ‘use of mathematical models of real-life systems to achieve various ways of designing 
and using these systems to achieve specified objectives at minimum cost’.23  
 
While the Task Force Report dwelt on a range of technological possibilities, including the 
development of digital fingerprinting and the use of helicopters, greatest attention was paid to the 
technological and mathematical development of police systems of communications, command and 
control. Applying the quantitative tools of Systems Analysis, the IDA reasoned it is was in the area 
of command and control where ‘the potential for improvement is probably greater here than in any 
other aspect of police operations’.24 The Report envisaged the use of computerised command and 
control centres that went well beyond merely ‘automating existing procedures’ but which would 
provide statistical calculations and projections based upon ‘study and experiment’ of how police 
responded to emergency situations, how patrol should be allocated by geography and time, optimum 
patrol tactics and even how to respond to riots. Underlying the report was the belief that ‘in both 
military and police work, rapid and complete information gathering, decision-making, and 
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dissemination are of crucial importance’ going on to note that police response time ‘can often be 
reduced by speeding up the command and control function’.25  
 
The Task Force Report – and its dedication to accelerating command and control – gave rise to a 
specific research field of police patrol analysis, that sought to apply mathematical models to patrol 
dispatch and distribution. The earliest use of computers in policing was in patrol allocation, and in 
the early 1960s IBM had developed the Law Enforcement Manpower Resource Allocation System 
(LEMRAS) engaged by the Saint Louis Police Department.26 Further models were developed in 
through the 1960s and 1970s. Richard Larson – an electrical engineer from MIT – was a researcher 
on the Task Force Report and sought to apply queuing theory to problems of patrol deployment. 
Queuing theory had been developed in the early twentieth century and had grown increasingly 
sophisticated over the course of the Second World War.27 Larson’s ‘hypercube model’ was developed 
into a book length study, and also included simulations that allowed police managers to experiment 
with how different forms of police deployment – primarily the adding or subtracting of officers – 
would impact upon response times. Those working on police patrol analysis calculations became 
frustrated by the randomness and incalculability of police activity between calls for service.28 In an 
executive summary of the Patrol Car Allocation Model (PCAM), developed by RAND Corporation’s 
New York Office, Chaiken and Dupont identified the major impediment to more precise modelling 
as posed by ‘meals, self-initiated anticrime activities, maintenance or repair for the vehicle, special 
assignments by a superior officer, and authorised or unauthorised personal activities’. These, they 
suggested, accounted for between 35 percent and 60 percent of police time and it was imperative they 
were rendered calculable for optimal functioning of the model.29  
The Systems Analysis approach sought the rapid dissemination of information, but also expanded 
collection of data on police operations – which it was reasoned would facilitate evermore precise 
accuracy in the mathematical models. One means of achieving this was through some form of remote 
vehicle monitoring that would track police operations in real-time. Prefiguring the widespread 
incorporation of computer terminals within police vehicles, the Report pointed to a range of potential 
developments that potentially facilitated police in the field being continuously monitored and 
analysed. The miniaturization of radio equipment was advocated so that officers could be contacted 
and monitored even when away from their vehicles. ‘Teleprinters’ in vehicles were imagined, through 
which information could be rapidly exchanged from the street to the command center, and vice versa. 
Particular interest was expressed in the capacity to monitor and map patrol car movements in real 
time – primarily to assist in automated patrol allocation – with suggestions for sensor and transponder 
networks to allow the tracking of patrol cars in transit. What was termed Automatic Vehicle 
Monitoring (AVM) was to emerge as a policing innovation always just about to happen. Police 
reporter turned ethnographer Jonathan Rubinstein noted in his 1973 study of Philadelphia Police that 
engineers were ‘developing radar-operated car-locator systems, which will show on an electrified 
map the exact location of each patrol car’.30 The 20 million dollar Los Angeles Police Department 
Electronic Command and Control System – developed in the 1960s and located in a bomb-proof 
bunker – was initially to have included a computerized mapping system that would monitor every 
patrol car on a live display grid, but this was abandoned due to cost.31 The integration of GPS data in 
many predictive policing software programs brings this long held aspiration to fruition.  
 
The mathematization of command and control represented a significant development in the 
automation of policing, although the impact of such automation was overwhelmingly discussed in 
positive terms of effectiveness and efficiency. How patrol officers experienced such technological 
systems was regarded as largely unproblematic. One notable exception to this was the Marxist police 
scholar Sid Harring. In 1981 Harring published a short article entitled ‘Taylorization of Police Work: 
Prospects for the 1980s’ in which he directly linked police computerization to the processes of labour 
force deskilling outlined by Harry Braverman in Labour and Monopoly Capital.32 The fiscal crisis 
emerging out of the 1973 Oil Crisis had focused new attention on the management of police work, 
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with a raft of studies appearing that examined – and proposed models for improving – productivity 
in policing. A key work in the field was Joan Wolfe and John Heaphy’s 1975 Readings on Productivity 
in Policing, published by the Police Foundation, which was followed by a wave of publications 
financed by the Federal Government Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) including 
Police Productivity (1978), Police Management (1978) and Police Manpower Management (1980). 
Investment in information technology – combined with ever more elaborate models of personnel 
management – were viewed as possible means by which the elusive concept of police productivity 
might be achieved.  
 
Kent Colton, a Professor at the MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning, evaluated the San 
Diego Computer Aided Dispatch in the late 1970s. His evaluation suggested the most significant 
barriers to technology adoption in police agencies were human, reporting that ‘the greatest problems 
which surfaced were still the “people questions” of morale and motivation’.33 The primary human 
problem was that of boredom, with Colton noting that ‘the system was so highly automated that a 
member of staff became bored because the machine controls had taken over many duties’. The San 
Diego CAD system had, he conceded, ‘destroyed the personal touch’.34 While research into computer 
systems within police departments continued, analysis of the potential of computerization to induce 
worker alienation was most frequently ascribed to resistance to change or to the amorphous ‘people 
question’ indicated by Colton. Nevertheless, in detailed ethnographic work conducted by Ericson and 
Haggerty in the early 1990s, there were some revealing findings. At the time of their fieldwork, the 
in-car ‘teleprinters’ envisaged in the IDA study had become a reality with the diffusion of in-car 
computer terminals for transmitting information between officers in the field and control centres. 
They noted a ‘pervasive concern among police officers about the dehumanizing effects of some of 
the communication technologies being used’ going on to report that the CAD terminals in patrol cars 
– and their screen formats – ‘were seen as too mechanical, to the point where patrol officers were 
made to feel that they themselves were little more than machines’.35 
 
Flexible Business-Like Policing 
Two inter-related philosophies of policing bear a direct lineage to predictive policing: problem-
oriented policing and COMPSTAT. Both emerged from sustained criticism of the professional model 
of policing as expounded by police reformers such as August Vollmer and O.W. Wilson—
quantitatively enshrined in the mathematical models of police patrol analysis. Despite ever greater 
efficiency in terms of dispatch and response, crime rates – the standard measure of police success or 
failure – continued to rise. Virulent criticism was levelled at the perceived process efficiency fetishism 
evident in the fixation on response times, with the suggestion that policing agencies were ossified 
unresponsive bureaucracies fixated with means at the expense of ends. The situation was succinctly 
summarised by University of Wisconsin-Madison Law Professor Herman Goldstein, who suggested 
that police agencies had ‘reached a plateau at which the highest objective to which they can aspire is 
administrative competence’. Elaborating his critique with analogy, Goldstein went on to note that; 
‘the situation is rather like that of a private industry that studies the speed of its assembly line, the 
productivity of its employees, and the nature of its public relations program, but does not examine 
the quality of its product’.36 
 
The central tenets of problem-oriented policing were outlined by Goldstein in a 1979 article, and later 
elaborated in a book length study. Goldstein defined several factors that were compelling a 
reconceptualization of policing, including the fiscal crisis in US cities, which meant that police were 
under duress to provide demonstrable outcomes that resulted from their budgets, an increasing 
consumer mentality amongst the public in relation to police services, and the necessity – as Goldstein 
perceived – to side step rank and file resistance from police unions that had followed other efforts at 
substantive structural change within police bureaucracies. In reconceptualising the police mission, 
Goldstein revisited the contested question of what actually constituted the ‘product’ of policing. He 
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argued that the police dealt with a range of behavioural and social problems, and that their product, 
consequently, was to find solutions to those problems. The police were professional problem solvers. 
 
The precepts of problem-oriented policing reinvented the police officer as an entrepreneur responsible 
for the research, design and delivery of public safety products. What became known simply by the 
acronym POP, stressed the research and evaluation of local problems in their specificity, and a 
commitment to collaborative problem-solving that involved diverse agencies and actors drawn from 
business, government and communities. Collaborative crime control projects were to be attended with 
careful evaluation – mostly quantitative – to form banks of case studies that would then inform ‘best 
practice’. Rather than random patrolling to identify offenders, Goldstein envisaged policing as a series 
of flexible collaborative research-based projects. In devising the solutions to problems that constituted 
their product, officers were also encouraged to explore novel alternatives not restricted to law and 
regulation. Structurally, POP aimed to free officers from the strictures of hierarchical top-down 
command and control techniques of the professional policing model. Mirroring emerging 
management discourses, POP envisaged policing agencies as lithe open networks, responsive to 
change and engaged in a continuous process of research, innovation and evaluation driving towards 
continuous improvement.37 The mimicry of business models was more than just analogous; it was 
often a direct transplantation. From the 1970s police agencies aspiring to overturn the perceived evils 
of the professional model opened their doors to a flood of consultants from the private sector. External 
consultants imparted the latest wisdom from the world of business; which was then operationalised 
within police organizations.38 Importantly POP also advanced the notion of data-driven agencies – 
data that in its contingent and specific conception of ‘problems’ extended well beyond the traditional 
in-house sources of police and crime statistics.  
 
The decentralised organisational vision of POP was to some extent absorbed within COMPSTAT – a 
system initiated in New York City in the 1990s, and heavily reliant on computerization, crime 
mapping and statistics. The term COMPSTAT is often taken to be an abbreviation of computer 
statistics, however Vincent Henry (a former NYPD detective) maintains it was simply the name of 
the computer directory where the original programmer stored the data processed by the system.39 The 
significance of COMPSTAT to the development of predictive policing rests in evident ways in the 
fusion of statistical data with police work, but additionally through the close association of William 
J. Bratton with the programme. Bratton remains the most high-profile figure in American policing, 
and after serving in the Marine Police Corps during the Vietnam War, became a sworn officer in the 
Boston Police Department in 1970, going on to lead three of the largest police departments in the 
United States; Boston, New York and Los Angeles.40 Discussion and analysis of COMPSTAT has 
frequently been overshadowed by Bratton’s fervent and concurrent advocacy in the 1990s of the 
police strategy that accompanied it: ‘broken windows’ policing. The term ‘broken windows’ was 
drawn from a short article published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1982 by George Kelling and James Q. 
Wilson, whose essential argument was that aggressive policing of minor incivilities in 
neighbourhoods would lead to a reduction of more serious offences, and consequently to an overall 
reduction in crime rates.41 When statistical declines in crime in New York City did occur during 
Bratton’s tenure, heated debate erupted within criminology which critiqued the statistical validity of 
the claims (crime declines had occurred in many other US cities without broken windows policing) 
and pointed to the deleterious impact of aggressive police tactics within communities.42 
 
While important, an exclusive focus on the broken windows strategy – with which COMPSTAT was 
neither initially nor intrinsically linked – has tended to deflect attention from the fact that COMPSTAT 
was first and foremost a police management paradigm.43 The most visible aspect of COMPSTAT 
management in practice – realistically portrayed in US police drama The Wire – resided in twice-
weekly strategy meetings, where precinct commanders appeared before senior police administration 
to report on their area statistics; and to explain what strategies they had put in place to deal with them. 
COMPSTAT meetings were held in a ‘data-saturated environment’ where statistics and other 
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information were projected onto screens, with commanders required to respond to questions from 
senior police management, other precinct commanders and at times members of the public and the 
media. COMPSTAT differed from POP however in that responsibility was devolved – not to frontline 
officers – but firmly to middle management who in US police agencies were generally precinct 
commanders. While commanders were given greater latitude in terms of setting priorities and 
allocating resources, many found COMPSTAT intensified work hours and stress – as one officer 
commented to researchers ‘a precinct commander has no life [outside Compstat]’.44 Supposedly 
COMPSTAT management aimed at an equilibrium between punishment and reward. Nevertheless, as 
it operated the balance tilted strongly towards punishment.  
 
The data-driven nature of COMPSTAT accelerated the collection and processing of data – with 
precinct commanders having access to crime analyses for the previous week, rather than three or six-
month old data in earlier computer analysis. Crime mapping also underwent rapid diffusion with the 
take-up of COMPSTAT inspired programs by US police forces. Crime mapping was used to analyse 
how crime and patrol were clustered geographically, and also for ‘hour of the day’ and ‘crime spike’ 
analysis. Consistent with the precepts of POP, other data-sets were also integrated: workload data, 
population demographics and municipal government data45.  COMPSTAT was heavily data-driven, 
placing emphasis not only on timely statistical data but also upon its visualization through crime 
mapping. Consequently, the enthusiastic take-up of COMPSTAT within US police agencies also 
signalled the integration of computerization into routine patrol work on an unprecedented scale – a 
trend abetted by the development of Client Server Technology in the 1980s and the development of 
personal computers with sufficient processing power for increasingly complex mapping and statistical 
programs. Moreover, while Goldstein’s vision of POP had suggested police officers actively 
mobilizing their local knowledge to arrive at solutions, under COMPSTAT ‘solutions’ were often 
generated by increasingly sophisticated software programs. Although still heavily reliant on human 
crime analysts, the machine was progressively providing both an analysis of the problem and the 
solution to it.  
 
While the term ‘predictive policing’ invites comparison to the speculative calculations that infused 
security organizations after 9/11, it also builds upon less dramatic developments in criminological 
research.46 The immediate technical precursors of predictive policing were more prosaic exercises in 
quantitative criminology, aimed at crime reduction and the efficient deployment of police resources. 
The first was ‘hot spot’ analysis, that seeks to identify high crime locations (usually limited in size to 
locations that can be viewed in their entirety by the human eye at street-level). Hot spot analysis has 
primarily been used to allocate police patrol to specific locations, often engaging the ‘Koper Curve’, 
which, based upon analysis of 110 hot spots in Minneapolis, suggested that ten to fifteen minutes was 
the optimal time for a patrol to remain at a location to achieve ‘residual deterrence’ (the length of time 
until crime reappears at the location).47 By the late 1990s quantitative criminologists were suggesting 
that more sophisticated computer analyses could be undertaken to identify ‘early indicators’ of future 
hot spot locations, thereby energizing more proactive patrol. These efforts received a substantial boost 
in the late 1990s, when the National Institute of Justice funded five predictive modelling research 
projects, that engaged diverse methodologies from fields such as artificial neural network mapping, 
spatial econometrics and epidemiology.48 A further impetus was the development of criminological 
research into ‘near repeat’ patterns of crime - first calculated using statistics of house burglary 
processed through an algorithm developed within epidemiological research in the 1960s - suggesting 
the probabilities of further crimes increased not only for specific street addresses, but also for those 
in surrounding areas. As Benbouzid notes in a detailed analysis of the evolution of near-repeat 
criminological research, the software mapping program that emerged from it (PROMAP, an 
abbreviation of Prospective Crime Mapping) aimed to move beyond simple linear models through 
which past patterns would be replicated, towards increasingly complex spatio-temporal modelling of 
future crimes engaging notions of contagion.49  
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The privileging of statistical data and analysis in COMPSTAT was amplified and reinforced by a 
surge of interest after 9/11 in another policing strategy termed Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP). ILP 
emerged in the 1990s, initially from attempts by Kent Police in the UK to disrupt local crime 
networks.50 ILP emphasized targeted police interventions based upon extensive data collection from 
covert informants, offender interviews, recorded crime and calls for service, surveillance of suspects 
and miscellaneous community sources. Akin to COMPSTAT, ILP envisaged ‘business-like’ and data-
driven policing that was proactive rather than reactive, and which encouraged flexible team-based 
structures and collaborative information sharing beyond internal ‘silos’ and bringing in external 
partners both public and private. Nevertheless, ILP did not embrace as POP had done the concept of 
the individual officer as public safety entrepreneur. ILP revived earlier professional models of top-
down control, where analysis and intelligence flowed up to the executive level, who would set targets 
and priorities to be enacted on the frontline.  
 
By the mid-2000s ILP had evolved into a broader philosophy that used data-driven decision making 
and strategic problem-solving not only for crime control but also for police management and resource 
allocation.51 The inclusion and collation of disparate sources of data advanced by ILP dovetailed 
seamlessly with the US post-9/11security zeitgeist. In the 1990s, Ericson and Haggerty had already 
noted that computerization – and the ease of data collection and retrieval it facilitated – stimulated 
data fetishism through police hoarding of ‘just-in-case knowledge about crime and criminals’.52 The 
9/11 Report’s conclusion that there had been a failure to ‘connect the dots’ energized this tendency, 
which spread across security domains. As Mark Andrejevic has suggested ‘the appetite of the 
database … is, for the foreseeable future, insatiable’.53 The wisdom of expansive data collection was 
exemplified in what was to become the foundational morality tale of predictive policing: the story of 
Walmart, the hurricane and strawberry Pop Tarts. Using data mining and predictive analytics to scour 
their databases, Walmart was able to adjust its supply chain in anticipation of hurricane conditions. 
Predictive analytics dictated that the products most in demand during hurricane conditions were 
bottled water, ducted tape and strawberry Pop Tarts. There were two key lessons advanced from the 
tale of Walmart and strawberry Pop Tarts. The first was that, through data mining and predictive 
analytics, policing agencies could become flexible, responsive and anticipatory. The second lesson 
was that – despite the logic of bottled water and ducted tape – it was not obvious why consumers 
facing a hurricane would want to buy Pop Tarts – in particular strawberry ones. The moral of the story 
was that it wasn’t necessary to know. What mattered was the statistical fact that they did buy them.54  
 
By the time PredPol™ launched the first commercially available predictive policing software in 2011 
the concept had been widely discussed, and in some policing areas already implemented. Predictive 
policing was, in this sense, born fully formed – a medley of contemporary policing methodologies 
and philosophies. As one Police Chief from Nebraska who attended an NIJ predictive policing 
symposium in 2010 astutely remarked, predictive policing was nothing new. It was, rather, a melange 
of strategies and tactics already familiar; ‘predictive policing’ had just simply brought them ‘under 
the one umbrella’. He did, nevertheless, comment that one notable difference was ‘the tremendous 
infusion of data’.55 Consequently, the diffusion of predictive policing software, and the number of 
vendors, has rapidly expanded. Animated public and academic discussion of predictive policing needs 
to remain cognisant of the way that ‘predictive policing’ has become shorthand for describing a more 
extensive process of digitalisation unfolding within policing agencies. Predictive policing software is 
often simply one component part of larger modular technological systems that incorporate disparate 
technologies from body worn cameras and sub-lethal weapons through to public and private area 
surveillance systems and digitized police databases. Policing agencies are also being implored to head 
to the Cloud, with technology corporations such as Microsoft offering specific ‘Public Safety and 
Justice’ cloud-based platforms that extend from policing to parole, and are envisaged as an essential 
component of the digital infrastructure of Smart Cities.56 Policing thus represents a sizeable target 
market for platform capitalism, with the ‘Public Safety and Justice’ market segment worth US$247.5 
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billion in 2016 and estimated to reach US$456.56 billion by 2021.57 Predictive policing is now 
platform policing.    
 
What was less clear with the initial flurry of interest in predictive policing was the impact it would 
have on agencies internally, in terms of the management and control of frontline officers. One 
evaluation study – led by co-founder of PredPol™ mathematician Geoff Mohler – extolled the virtues 
of integrating GPS tracking to provide greater analytical precision, but also to ‘provide information 
on officer activity when not on a predictive policing mission’.58 Some indication of the management 
imaginary contained within predictive policing was provided in an article co-written by COMPSTAT 
founder Bratton with Sean Malinowski, then Assistant Commander of the LAPD Real-Time Analysis 
and Critical Response Centre, and later a key figure in LAPD’s adoption of PredPol™. In 2002 
Bratton became Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Chief of Police, where he continued to 
develop the managerial aspects of the COMPSTAT model into what he dubbed COMPSTAT Plus. In 
developing COMPSTAT as a managerial tool, Bratton and Malinowski looked directly to major 
retailers – in particular Target Corporation – who were able to monitor employees performance ‘in 
real time according to a series of integrated performance metrics that measure and then display 
weighted data’. As with POP and ILP, the authors viewed the police organisation as an increasingly 
porous and collaborative enterprise venture, with the future viewed as an opportunity to ‘expand our 
partnerships with our academic and business communities to continually improve our ability to 
forecast crime’.59 In this vision, the desire for efficiency evident in the 1960s application of Systems 
Analysis reached its zenith in an imaginary of totally instantaneous transmission and control. As 
Bratton and Malinowski articulate this vision: 
 
Soon we will see LAPD officers receiving information in relation to their position in time and 
space via Global Positioning Satellite technology and then acting on and reporting their actions 
as they are happening for immediate inclusion in the data set. By streamlining data entry and 
automating it, and then developing a more robust capability to data mine, we will move closer 
and closer to real time.60 
 
With a keen interest not only in crime control, but also in intensive monitoring and control of those 
charged with producing it, the authors suggest partnering with ‘businesses at the forefront of 
performance management’ to share methodologies. Bratton and Malinowski advocate the collection 
of a wide-range of digitised data on police personnel; including metrics of overtime control, sick and 
injured on duty time usage, morale, community satisfaction, misconduct, excessive force, officer 
safety and employee wellness. Moreover, the POP concept of the patrol officer as entrepreneur and 
innovator is eclipsed by a vision of the patrol officer as delivery driver of public safety solutions – 
solutions calculated in advance and merely awaiting enactment. Glancing to the future, they suggest 
that: ‘Computer technology will also likely be used to not only identify issues earlier, but to 
recommend interventions based on artificial intelligence support programs and functions that are self-
healing and self-correcting’.61 
 
The adaptation of business models in predictive policing is frequently explicit. Craig Uchida, a 
researcher from Justice and Security, Inc., remarked at the first predictive policing symposium in Los 
Angeles in 2009 that an intrinsic aspect of predictive policing was ‘connecting corporate ideas and 
methods to policing’. 62  Nevertheless, in the comprehensive datafication and monitoring of the 
individual officer, there are evident affinities with contemporary military conceptions of the soldier 
on the electronic battlefield extending from the precepts of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). 
The notion of ‘network-centric warfare’– which extends from the principles of RMA – absorbs 
notions of flexibility, speed and complexity into military infrastructures, and draws upon concepts 
from economic and business management that imagine rapid interactions between informational 
nodes. ‘Value’ is then generated via the integrity and tempo of data pulsing between nodes of the 
network. The nearer information inclines towards complete precision, relevance and instantaneous 
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transmission and reception, the closer to full-spectrum superiority the military network proceeds.63 
Contemporary corporate imaginaries envisage this model transposed onto the policing context, as a 
continuous and instantaneous transmission enfolds the body of the patrol officer. Motorola Solutions, 
for example, has developed a sensorised patrol uniform that integrates display smart glasses, 
biometric health monitoring, gun holster sensors and environmental sensors. This ‘future-ready’ 
system – the brochure suggests – ‘empowers police officers to respond and change the trajectory of 
a single moment while still in that moment’.64 
 
The vision of integrated cloud security ‘solutions’ for policing perpetually reiterates the future of 
policing as a continuous process of real-time data exchange and analysis. This vision was forcefully 
expounded in TASER International’s 2017 Law Enforcement Technology Report. Daniel Zehdner – 
former manager of the Las Vegas Police Department Body-Worn Camera Program – provided the 
following scenario for the TASER report to promote the advantage of cloud-based security paired 
with real time analytics: 
 
I could potentially walk down the street with a camera in real-time, scanning faces, 
doing facial recognition while it’s recording, sending that data to the cloud for real-time 
analysis, have that data come back and somebody tell me, “That guy in the red hat, red 
shoes you just passed, he’s wanted for burglary”. That type of real-time, big data analysis 
application would be huge.65  
 
Progressively the informational carapace surrounding patrol officers replicates a synthetic real-time 
most frequently associated with online contexts. As Adrian Mackenzie argues, this is a conception of 
real-time which attempts to ‘collapse the intervals between event and its reception, so that the event 
is structured by its processing’.66  
 
While such a scenario is likely to excite some police managers – and prove equally horrifying for 
their critics – these future scenarios elide the issue of how such systems also increasingly gesture 
towards the automation of police decision-making through continuous data flows that fold back upon 
themselves. This possibility is also canvassed in the TASER report, which includes an interview with 
Dr George Poste. Poste suggests that ‘many elements of decision support software are now eclipsing 
in a superior way, the judgement of highly skilled professionals, simply because the scale and 
multidimensionality of the data sets quickly eclipses the cognitive capacity of humans’. 67  The 
potential of automated decision-making – facilitated by the datafication of all police interactions – is 
also echoed by Patrick Perrot from the French Ministry of Interior. Perrot suggests that the missing 
element in automated police decision-making is ‘the intention of the police officer’. Nevertheless, he 
goes on to suggest that ‘we cannot exclude for the future that the extension of AI in this field is based 
on an analysis of police officer patterns’.68 Herbert Simon argued in 1960 that in some fields human 
workers would continue to enjoy comparative advantage, including ‘some kinds of nonprogrammed 
problem solving, and some kinds of service activities where face-to-face human interaction is of the 
essence’.69 Policing can be viewed as having both these characteristics. Simon was, however, judging 
this from a purely economic perspective. Recent advances in predictive policing – that pledge 
economy through datafication, and increasingly see software programs fused into larger technological 
ensembles – aspire to a vision initiated by the Systems Analysts in the 1960s. Efficiency and economy 
in policing are argued to be best achieved through datafication – and it is through datafication that 
police patrol is being progressively automated. 
 
New cloud-based policing platforms project an imaginary of just-ahead-of-time law enforcement that 
anticipates and neutralizes crime and disorder before, or at the instant of, materialization. Once 
decried for being hierarchical and rigid, police agencies are reenvisaged as fluid networks; rapidly 
adaptable, continuously evolving and in a state of perpetual experiment. Moreover, datafication prises 
open police agencies for the value-seeking mechanisms of the digital economy. 70  Policing is 
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increasingly interpellated by technology enterprises not only through direct contracts, but through the 
informatization and commodification of police knowledge. The nearer police data flows edge towards 
instantaneity, the higher the potential value generated. The datafication of police work is also 
advanced as an ultra-solution to the manifold problems that beset contemporary US policing, ranging 
from stretched budgets to police brutality and violence. Senior policing figures celebrate the potential 
for finely targeted resources, improved knowledge of communities and intensified workforce control 
that attend extensive datafication; evident in the recently coined concept of ‘precision policing’.71 
Others see the potential for enhanced police accountability, calling for transparency through access 
to the extensive data trails now emitted from the body of the officer.72 At present the outcomes of 
digital police automation are uncertain. What is clear, however, is that policing – which had 
historically mirrored business models but struggled with how its ‘value’ could be measured – is 
becoming ever more integrated into the circuits of platform capitalism73 – both as a consumer and a 
producer of value.  
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